University of Chicago Press

The Moral Integration of American Cities. II
Author(s): Robert Cooley Angell
Source: *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 80, No. 3 (Nov., 1974), pp. 607-629
Published by: University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2777250
Accessed: 16-10-2015 17:02 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *American Journal of Sociology*.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The Moral Integration of American Cities. II[1]

Robert Cooley Angell
University of Michigan

An attempted exact replication, after 30 years, of a study of the moral integration of large American cities yields far less conclusive results than the original. One element at fault is a component of the moral integration index—the welfare effort index. When this is omitted and an index of crime is used as the sole indicator of moral integration, the independent variables of heterogeneity, in-migration, and dwelling value spread achieve added power; but the success of the first study is not duplicated. When population size is added as an independent variable results are improved somewhat. A comparison of 40 cities common to both studies shows greater homogeneity among them in 1970 than in 1940, probably because in-migration has faced them with similar problems.

The purpose of this study is to explore the moral integration of American cities of more than 100,000 in 1970 in a fashion comparable with that employed in a previous study focused on 1940. Two questions have guided the research: (1) Have the changes in American cities over 30 years so affected causal processes as to render the conclusions of the previous study invalid for 1970? (2) Do the cities maintain similar relative positions on a scale of moral integration after three decades? To obtain answers to these questions has required that the replication be as nearly exact as possible.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORIGINAL STUDY

To make clear the focus, procedures, and results of the study being replicated, a brief historical account is necessary. Parsons's elucidation in *The Structure of Social Action* in 1937 of Durkheim's theory had stimulated me to carry on with the interest in social integration that I expressed in *The Family Encounters the Depression* (Angell 1936). I was particularly attracted by the concept of mechanical solidarity and the possibility of using it to study large social units. As I cast about for appropriate empirical data I chanced upon a U.S. Children's Bureau bulletin, *The Community Welfare Picture as Reflected in Health and Welfare Statistics in 29 Urban Areas, 1938*. This gave me a field of operation.

[1] I am glad to acknowledge the generous computer advice and assistance of John Fox, formerly research associate and visiting lecturer in the sociology department of the University of Michigan, now at the University of Alberta.

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The exploratory study that resulted (Angell 1942) used a welfare effort index as a positive indicator of community integration and a crime index as a negative indicator (their correlation was —.39). The 28 cities used were then allocated to five groups. Three showed consistency between the welfare effort scores and the crime scores (inverted)[2] and were labeled "well integrated," "moderately integrated," and "poorly integrated." In the fourth group the crime scores showed much more integration than the welfare effort scores, and in the fifth the welfare effort scores showed much more than the crime scores.

A search for independent variables with predictive power was then undertaken, using only the consistent cities. Analysis of data from the early thirties in Thorndike's *Your City* (1940) gave rise to the following hypotheses worth further study: "The social integration of a city tends to be greater (1) the more the schools, libraries, and recreational facilities have been supported in the past; (2) the greater the proportion of native whites to Negroes, Orientals, and Mexicans; (3) the fewer the mothers who are gainfully employed; and, possibly, (4) the less the disparity of incomes between the various social classes" (Angell 1942, p. 589).

The two groups of inconsistent cities were then examined. The group in which the crime scores evidenced more integration than the welfare effort scores consisted of three of the smallest cities. I suggested that in them, because of help from neighbors and kin, families were not so much in need of the public aid dealt with in the Children's Bureau study as were families in larger cities. The group in which the welfare effort scores evidenced more integration than the crime scores consisted of four cities near the border of North and South: Richmond, Cincinnati, Louisville, and Indianapolis. Here my suggestion was that the racial and sectional frictions were so great that even strong welfare efforts did not bring about the social integration that keeps crime rates down. Later work with the crime index and the welfare effort index has led me to the view that each represents an aspect of moral integration, the former a passive condition, the latter an active one. Whether or not there is a high crime rate in a city expresses a diffuse pattern of conditions; whether or not there is a strong welfare effort reflects a condition of collective will.

After a three-year hiatus in World War II, I embarked on a larger study to follow up the clues from the exploratory study. Since I wanted to canvass new possibilities for a welfare effort index (there being no later data like those of the Children's Bureau study) and possibilities for new independent variables, I focused on the census year of 1940. The study was carried out in two phases, the first statistical. A partial report on it was

[2] Since the crime scores ranged from 1.6 for Milwaukee to 17.5 for Atlanta, they were inverted by subtracting each score from 20. Hereafter in this article "crime scores" and "crime index" denote the scores and the index as inverted.

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

published within two years (Angell 1947). The second phase was done through the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan (with the collaboration of Eugene Jacobson). Interviews were conducted in four theoretically strategic cities. The results of the exploratory study and the two phases of the more definitive study were published in an inclusive monograph (Angell 1951). What has been replicated using 1970 census data is the complete statistical study as reported in chapters 2 and 3 of the monograph.

My concept of moral integration developed in the course of the decade. I started with the general concept of social integration. The account of the exploratory study gives no concise definition but uses such statements as: "One of the most important questions . . . about a human aggregate of any kind is whether its members are closely knit together by a common outlook and common aspirations. . . . There seems to be no satisfactory way of getting at questions of community loyalty directly, and very few satisfactory indices of a community spirit have been suggested. . . . Perhaps we may regard those cities that shoulder a larger proportion of their local welfare responsibilities, everything else equal, as better integrated than those that make less effort. . . . Agreement on fundamental moral issues is an obvious indication of solidarity. . . . Perhaps the degree of neighborliness in a community could be measured and would be symptomatic" (Angell 1942, pp. 575, 578). It is evident that social bonds, cultural sharing, and normative responsibility were all being included. The first write-up of the postwar statistical study seems to put more emphasis on the normative aspect: "At the level of the community, the nation, and the world, we are faced with grave problems resulting from the lack of a firm moral order to which people are loyal and in terms of which conflicting parties may be reconciled" (Angell 1947, p. 335). But in the title the term "social integration" was still used.

It was not until I analyzed the results of the survey research of 1947 that I switched from "social integration" to "moral integration" (Angell 1949). The interviews in the four cities showed that the "friendliness" of a city (which I called "interpersonal integration") is a different dimension from such aspects as general satisfaction with the community, level of personal conduct, relations among groups, and participation in civic affairs. I decided that what I was essentially interested in was moral integration. There I defined it as "the degree to which the life of the group proceeds in terms of shared ends and values. The life of the group will obviously not proceed in these terms unless persons develop a sense of mutual responsibility for each other and a loyalty to the institutions of the group" (Angell 1949, p. 248).

The inclusive monograph presented a more detailed discussion: "Accord-

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ing the life of any group rewarding to its members is the degree to which there is a set of common ends and values toward which all are oriented and in terms of which the life of the group is organized. It is, we believe, the showing of any city in this respect that in the long run makes it good or bad. The technical term for this characteristic of group life is 'moral integration.' Actually the idea is very familiar. Words like 'loyalty,' 'solidarity,' and 'morale' cover much the same ground. Each refers in a different way to the cohesiveness that comes from common orientation to the problems of life. . . . What is required is that there be adherence to enough standards and common belief in enough principles to make possible the group's effective functioning" (Angell 1951, p. 2). If pressed for a definition now, I would say that a high degree of moral integration involves a mutually consistent set of norms derived from common values, norms which members of the group, community, or society have internalized as guides to their behavior. This is essentially what Durkheim meant by mechanical solidarity.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN FOR 1940 AND FOR 1970

Since it has been impossible in the statistical study based on 1970 data to replicate exactly the one based on 1940 data, I will take up the procedures followed and results obtained in each of the studies, comparing one with the other as I proceed. References to census and FBI sources will be given only for the replication. Such references for the earlier study can be found in the monograph (Angell 1951).

Both studies focused on cities of more than 100,000 population. This limitation was adopted in the earlier study because the census gathered information on one of the projected independent variables—geographical mobility—only for cities of that size. In 1940 there were 92 such. Unavailability of data for one or more other variables cut this number to 82. But the largest elimination occurred because I wanted the cities to be "independent" in the sense that they were not satellites or "twins" of other cities. The reasoning was that otherwise the integration of a city might be affected by influences emanating from large nearby centers of population. The requirement laid down was that three-fifths of the metropolitan district (then the term used) should be within the city and not more than half the remainder should be in a satellite city. This requirement eliminated 38 cities, to which New York was added because of its complex relation to surrounding communities. Thus the study was based on only 43 cities.

In the 1970 census there are 153 cities of more than 100,000. Only 31 of these, mostly in the Plains States and the South, contain three-fifths of the population of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area in which they are found. Thus 80% of the cities would have been eliminated if the 1940 rule had been followed, as compared with 41% that were dropped from the

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1940-based study for this reason. This would have made so unrepresentative a sample that I decided I must go to the SMSA as the unit of analysis.

There are 122 SMSAs in the 1970 census that contain one or more cities of 100,000. Of these, 59 had to be dropped: 10 because the crime area does not match the SMSA, eight because the United Fund area matches the SMSA insufficiently, and 41 because the United Fund data are inadequate. Thus the attempted exact replication is based on 63 SMSAs.

Following the cue from the exploratory study, I decided to use for the 1940-based study a crime index as a component of a projected integration index. The crime component then designed has been copied almost exactly in the replication. The FBI data on crimes known to the police were used in both studies. The yearly frequency per 100,000 inhabitants of murders and nonnegligent manslaughters, of robberies, and of burglaries were combined in accordance with a weighting scheme based on the relative frequencies of these three categories in all cities or SMSAs studied. The standard burglary frequency was divided by the standard frequencies of each of the other two; the square roots of these two quotients were then taken as multipliers of the robbery and the murder and nonnegligent manslaughter frequencies for each city. In the 1940-based study this made one homicide the equivalent of 7.75 burglaries, and one robbery equivalent to 2.44 burglaries; in the 1970-based study the corresponding weights were 12.33 and 2.34 (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 1971). The crime index was the sum of the three weighted scores thus obtained. In the 1940 study a three-year mean in each category was used; in the 1970 study, the single-year frequency.

The 1940 welfare effort index was derived from data obtained from the national office of Community Chests and Councils, Inc. The formula used was

$$\frac{\text{amount raised}}{\text{quota}} + \frac{\text{pledgers}}{\text{families in the area}} + \frac{\text{amount raised}}{.0033 \text{ yearly retail sales}}.$$

For 1970 data were obtained from the national office of the United Way of America in 1969. Because of differences in methods of recording, the welfare effort index for 1970 had to be simplified from that of 1940, and only the middle fraction was used. Fortunately, I had been informed by John R. Seeley, who had analyzed the 1940 data subsequent to the publication of the research monograph, that this fraction was almost as valid an indicator of welfare effort as the more elaborate measure.

Although other possible components of an integration index had been considered for the 1940 study, only the two already discussed, the crime index and the welfare effort index, were used. In 1940 the coefficient of correlation between these components was .43, indicating that the active aspect of moral integration (represented by the welfare effort index) and

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

the passive one (represented by the crime index) are related but somewhat independent of one another. The crime index was weighted twice as heavily as the welfare effort index in combining them to form the moral integration index.[3] The same two components have been combined in the same way in the replication, but the association between them is much weaker: $r = .17$. Possible reasons for this change will be discussed below.

The exploratory study had suggested four independent variables that might be related to moral integration. One of these was the heterogeneity of the population (expected to be a negative influence). This variable was constructed in the same way for both 1940 and 1970: the number of foreign-born whites plus twice the number of nonwhites (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970),[4] divided by the population. The only exception was Honolulu, in 1970, a city not included in the first stage of the replication but brought into the modified replication discussed below. Because Honolulu would have a heterogeneity score greater than 1.00 if the normal procedure were followed, Asians were taken to be the modal category and the numerator became the number of foreign-born Asians plus twice the number of non-Asians.

There is much support in the sociological literature for the proposition that movement of population makes for strain and disorder. Although there was some indication in the exploratory study that secondhand-store sales correlated negatively with moral integration, this hint was not formulated in the hypotheses for further research. The 1940 census, however, by recording the place of residence in 1935 of all inhabitants of cities over 100,000, gave a unique opportunity to explore the effect of movement of population. The difference in census treatment of in- and out-migration in 1940 and 1970, however, caused difficulties. In 1940 the census asked respondents where they had lived in 1935. The in-migrants were recorded at their place of 1940 residence. The compilation of the out-migrant figures must have been a herculean task since every person who had lived in a city of more than 100,000 in 1935 and had subsequently moved had to be credited to the city of earlier residence as an out-migrant.

The second measure used in the 1940 study was the sum of the percentages of in-migration and out-migration. It was called mobility. In 1970, only the in-migration figures are given, again by determining who lived elsewhere five years previously (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970).

[3] For the reasoning behind the weighting, see the monograph (Angell 1951, p. 125). There is an error in the formula on p. 125 for combining the crime and welfare effort scores. It should read:

$$x_1 = M_1 + \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_2}(x_2 - M_2).$$

[4] All the 1970 census tables from which data were drawn for this study are identified in the list of references below under "U.S. Bureau of the Census."

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Being unhappy about using in-migration only to represent mobility, I provided myself with an alternative: an index that combined in-migration with out-migration calculated as the remainder when population growth is subtracted from the sum of in-migration and natural increase, all for the 1960–70 period (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970). This alternative has the advantage of combining in- and out-migration, as in the 1940 study, but the disadvantage of assuming that in-migration for 1960–70 was double the known figures for 1965–70.

In the 1940 study I included the rate of city growth separately, as the third independent variable. When joined to heterogeneity and mobility, the coefficient of multiple correlation with moral integration did not increase because of the associations between city growth and both mobility and heterogeneity ($r = .53$ and $.27$, respectively). Since the differences between cities in rate of growth are only slightly influenced by differences in rate of natural increase, I have regarded this variable as similar to in-migration (one of the two 1970 mobility alternatives). I have therefore not used it as a separate independent variable for 1970.

For 1940 I used a fourth variable, rental spread, to measure the degree of separation between the top and bottom socioeconomic layers of a city's population. It was operationalized as the dollar difference between the mean of the highest 10% in actual or constructive rent and the mean of the lowest 10%. For 1970 I used the value of the home instead of rent, since in the 1970 census the property value of the dwelling is given for most families (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970). The variable is called dwelling value spread.[5]

The fifth significant independent variable for 1940 was the percentage of married women working. The breakdown in the 1970 census is finer, so I used the percentage of women (with children under 18) working (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970).

Before dealing with the results of the two studies I shall discuss briefly four independent variables explored in the 1940-based study that proved nonsignificant as predictors of moral integration. The first was city size. Though the sociologist's expectation that social problems increase with size was validated by 1940 crime rates up to 100,000, beyond that point there was a virtual plateau. The mean score of all cities over 250,000 on my crime index was only 4% above the mean score of all cities between 100,000 and 250,000. In the 43 cities used crime was minimally correlated with population ($r = -.06$). A plausible explanation is that at that time

[5] A problem arose because in a few of the SMSAs more than one-twentieth of the dwellings were in the top category—$50,000 and above. How determine the mean for the top 10%? This was accomplished by using the formula

$$\text{mean} = [(\%\ \text{dwellings above } \$50{,}000 - 5\%)/2]\ \$1{,}000 + \$50{,}000.$$

Thus if 10% of the dwellings were valued above $50,000, the mean of the top decile would be $52,500.

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

the advantage of smaller populations in the newer metropolises was offset by the greater competence of the older and more mature ones in handling their problems.

The second prospective independent variable that proved nonsignificant was level of living as measured by per capita retail sales. Its correlation with the moral integration index was zero. The third was the proportion of locally owned to absentee owned businesses. This was operationalized as the ratio of all locally resident proprietors, firm members, and officials to the total number of nonwage working employees as given by the 1939 census of manufactures. Contrary to hypothesis, the association with the integration index turned out to be significantly negative. Since no sociological principle seemed consonant with this finding, the variable was dropped.

The fourth blind alley was the proportion of the population who were members of religious denominations. The census of religious bodies, taken for the last time in 1936, was used to explore two hypotheses: (1) the greater the proportion of church members in a community, the greater the moral integration; and (2) the greater the ratio of Catholics to all church members, the greater the integration. The second hypothesis was suggested by Durkheim's theory of the individualism of Protestants. Neither hypothesis was verified.

The 1940-based study proceeded, therefore, in terms of a moral integration index with two components, crime and welfare effort—the former weighted twice as heavily as the latter—and five independent variables: heterogeneity, mobility, rate of city growth, rental spread, and percentage of married women working. For 1970 I used the same integration index, constructed in the same way, as the dependent variable and, again, five independent variables—this time heterogeneity, two-way migration, in-migration alone, dwelling value spread, and percentage of married women (with children under 18) working.

RESULTS OF THE REPLICATION

The First Stage

The principal findings of the 1940-based study are given in table 1. Here it is shown that all five independent variables were associated rather strongly with the moral integration index. Because heterogeneity and mobility were virtually independent of one another ($r = -.06$) their coefficient of multiple correlation with moral integration was high ($R = -.79$). This means that more than 62% of the variance among the cities in moral integration is accounted for by these two factors alone. The addition of other variables to the analysis (see table 1) gave little additional predictive power because rental spread and percentage of married women

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

TABLE 1

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FIVE ATTRIBUTES OF 43 CITIES AND THE INTEGRATION INDEX (1940)

Independent Variable	Integration Index
Zero-Order Pearsonian Coefficients	
Heterogeneity	—.59
Mobility	—.49
Rate of growth	—.43
Rental spread	—.65
Percentage of married women working	—.54
Multiple Correlation Coefficients	
Heterogeneity and mobility	—.79
Heterogeneity, mobility, and rate of growth	—.79
Heterogeneity, mobility, and rental spread	—.80
Heterogeneity, mobility, and percentage of married women working	—.79

working were closely correlated with heterogeneity, and rate of growth was closely correlated with mobility. Thus almost all the influence of the other three was already represented in heterogeneity and mobility. This result was gratifying, since it showed that more than three-fifths of the moral integration of American cities then could be explained by the effect of only two independent variables.

The results of the replication have proved far less gratifying. Table 2 gives the intercorrelations for 1970 of the five independent variables and the integration index. Table 3 gives coefficients of multiple correlation of various combinations of independent variables with the moral integration index, as does table 1 (bottom) for 1940. Tables 2 and 3 are further complicated by the inclusion of the relations of both alternatives for what was formerly called mobility: two-way migration and in-migration (the latter replacing rate of growth in 1940).

TABLE 2

INTERCORRELATION OF VARIABLES IN INITIAL REPLICATION FOR 63 SMSAs (1970)

	Integration Index	Hetero-geneity	Two-Way Migration	In-Migration	Dwelling Value Spread
Heterogeneity	—.17	...	...	...	...
Two-way migration	.01	—.01	...	...	...
In-migration	—.25	—.05	.85	...	...
Dwelling value spread	—.17	.15	.01	.26	...
Percentage of married women (with children under 18) working	—.05	.16	.13	.12	.12

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

TABLE 3

MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS OF VARIOUS SETS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH INTEGRATION INDEX FOR 63 SMSAs (1970)

Independent Variable	*R*
Two-way migration and heterogeneity	—.17
Two-way migration, heterogeneity, and dwelling value spread	—.22
Two-way migration, heterogeneity, and percentage of married women (with children under 18) working	—.17
In-migration and heterogeneity	—.31
In-migration, heterogeneity, and dwelling value spread	—.32
In-migration, heterogeneity, and percentage of married women (with children under 18) working	—.31

The most striking feature of table 2 is the general weakness of the correlation coefficients (except for the association between the mobility alternatives) as compared with 1940. In table 3 heterogeneity and two-way migration (the 1940 "mobility") yield a coefficient of multiple correlation of only —.17 with integration as compared with —.79 in the earlier results. The proportion of variance in moral integration thus accounted for is only 2.9% instead of 62.4%. This decline does not reflect a stronger association in 1970 between heterogeneity and two-way migration ($r = -.06$ for 1940, —.01 for 1970). If we take in-migration alone to represent mobility (clearly the more powerful of the two alternatives), the coefficient of multiple correlation of heterogeneity and mobility with integration is —.31, which accounts for 9.6% of the variance. Dwelling value spread, when joined to heterogeneity and two-way migration, increases the coefficient of multiple correlation from —.17 to —.22, and when joined to heterogeneity and in-migration, from —.31 to —.32. The addition of percentage of married women (with children under 18) working does not increase the multiple correlation coefficient.

Each one of the five independent variables covaries much less closely with moral integration in 1970 than in 1940. If we can regard rate of growth in 1940 and in-migration in 1970 as a rough pair, it is here that the association with integration in 1970 comes nearest to the strength of the relation in 1940 ($r = -.25$ compared with —.43).

These disappointing results prompted a search for procedures in the 1970 study that might be inferior to those of the 1940 study. Already mentioned has been the superiority of the data on two-way migration (then called mobility) in the 1940 census. The substitution of in-migration only in the 1970 study (roughly equivalent to rate of growth in the 1940 study) for the faulty measure of two-way migration improves the multiple correlations, but probably the loss of predictive power here compared with 1940 is significant.

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

It might seem that the possible inferiority of SMSAs to cities as the focus of the study should be discussed here as a change in research design. But, as already explained, this change was forced by the shrinkage in the proportion of cities that are independent in the 1940 sense. It is a change in American society, not a change in preferred procedure. The effect on the 1970 results will be discussed below.

Replacement of the Moral Integration Index by the Crime Index Alone

A more procedurally puzzling issue concerns the components of the integration index in 1970. The very weak association between crime and welfare effort ($r = .17$ as compared with .43 in the earlier study), coupled with the data in table 4 which reveal that three of the five pairs of rela-

TABLE 4

ZERO-ORDER PEARSONIAN CORRELATIONS OF FIVE ATTRIBUTES OF 63 SMSAs WITH COMPONENTS OF INTEGRATION INDEX (1970)

Independent Variable	Crime Index	Welfare Effort Index
Heterogeneity	—.31	.21
Two-way migration	.09	—.14
In-migration	—.13	—.33
Dwelling value spread	—.24	.07
Percentage of married women (with children under 18) working	—.02	—.08

NOTE.—Here and in subsequent tables the crime index is the inverted index described in n. 2.

tions of the components with independent variables are of opposite sign, casts grave suspicion on one or the other component. The evidence in the table points conclusively to the welfare effort index as the invalid one. Whereas both the inverted crime scores and the welfare effort scores are expected to be negatively correlated with all the independent variables, as they were in 1940, there are three positive correlation coefficients in the table: two-way migration with the crime index, heterogeneity with welfare effort, and dwelling value spread with welfare effort. Of these, the largest and therefore the least expected is the positive correlation of .21 of heterogeneity with welfare effort. The smaller positive correlation of two-way migration with the crime scores can be more logically attributed to invalidity of the two-way migration variable than to invalidity of the crime variable, since the crime index is negatively correlated with the other four independent variables, whereas two-way migration is associated in opposite directions with the crime index and the welfare effort index. The third positive coefficient (dwelling value spread with welfare effort) is small but does add to the doubt about the welfare effort index.

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

This doubt is strongly reinforced when crime alone is used as the dependent variable. Table 5 shows its multiple correlations with the independent

TABLE 5

MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS OF VARIOUS SETS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH INTEGRATION INDEX AND CRIME INDEX FOR 63 SMSAs (1970)

Independent Variable	Integration Index	Crime Index
Heterogeneity and two-way migration	—.17	—.32
Heterogeneity, two-way migration, and dwelling value spread	—.22	—.36
Heterogeneity, two-way migration, and percentage of married women (with children under 18) working	—.17	—.31
Heterogeneity and in-migration	—.31	—.34
Heterogeneity, in-migration, and dwelling value spread	—.32	—.38
Heterogeneity, in-migration, and percentage of married women (with children under 18) working	—.31	—.34

variables as compared with those of the integration index. The substitution of the crime index for the integration index increases the multiple correlations appreciably. The highest coefficient of multiple correlation with the integration index is —.32 (for heterogeneity, in-migration, and dwelling value spread); whereas the highest one with crime is —.38 (for the same three independent variables).

Inspection of the data set bears out what the correlation coefficient between crime and welfare effort (.17) has already revealed: there is no longer a strong tendency for high welfare effort and low crime rates to be found in the same cities. The Detroit SMSA, for instance, has the highest crime rate among the 63 but also has the fifth highest welfare effort, probably reflecting attempts to alleviate the conditions that gave rise to the race riots of 1967. Colorado Springs, on the other hand, has the lowest welfare effort but also is lower than 42 other cities in crime. A plot of the scores on the two components shows a much more random distribution than in 1940. The two aspects of moral integration—the active one of welfare effort and the passive one of crime rates—are very loosely connected, and the amount of crime seems the more sensitive indicator.

Why has the welfare effort index lost so much of its validity as a component of the moral integration index since 1940? The most plausible explanation is that, with the growth of the urban population, the migration into central cities of the poor (both black and white) and the flight of former residents to the suburbs have undermined the significance of giving to the United Fund as an indication of sacrifice for community welfare. Such giving has perhaps become a transfer of resources from the fortunate to the unfortunate at such a distance as not to represent vigorous human concern, but, in part at least, fear, a sense of guilt, or a perfunctory sense

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

of duty. In any event it is rarely inspired by the sort of firsthand acquaintance with the conditions to be alleviated that motivates the giver to get personally involved. In short, the active aspect of moral integration as thus measured has become less active.

The same thing is shown in another way. Race riots in large cities show that heterogeneity there creates social problems. It is well documented that in a problem-beset community crime rates rise. But in 1970 there is a small positive association between heterogeneity and welfare effort. Thus the same condition, heterogeneity, seems conducive to both crime and welfare effort. What kind of welfare effort is it that can vary concomitantly with crime? It seems that giving to the United Fund represents little active dedication to the mastering of the city's problems.

Another possibility is that the success of the welfare effort index in 1940 was a fluke; that discarding all cities that did not include three-fifths of the population of the metropolitan district stacked the cards in favor of the welfare effort index. According to this argument, in the larger cities Community Chest donations indicated less intense moral integration than in the smaller cities, while the imposition of the criterion of "independence" eliminated a higher proportion of the larger cities. In fact the 39 cities discarded did have a mean population 73% larger than the 43 cities included. The argument loses some of its strength, however, when it is pointed out that the 41 SMSAs discarded in 1970 for inadequate United Fund data also were larger. They had a mean population 48% higher than the 63 SMSAs included. Thus the 1970 study was reaping some of whatever advantage derives from smaller size, though not so much as the earlier study. In any event the difference in the success of the welfare effort index is too great to be attributed primarily to such phenomena.

In view of the decline in significance of the welfare effort index I decided to abandon it and replace the integration index by the crime index alone. In so doing, I have forgone the possibility of substituting a new welfare effort index. Quite frankly, the problem baffles me. I have not felt that I should delay the publication of the attempted replication until (if ever) I could find a valid substitute. Therefore the second procedural weakness of the replication, the inadequacy of the welfare effort index, will not be cured at this time and will remain a challenge for the future.

With the abandonment of the welfare effort index, many more cities became available for analysis. Forty-nine SMSAs of the 122 containing one or more cities of 100,000 population had been omitted because of inadequacies in United Fund data or because the United Fund area of coverage was too dissimilar from the SMSA. These 49 SMSAs could now be added to the 63 already analyzed to yield a set of 112.

Of the two indicators of mobility in the original replication—two-way migration and in-migration only—the latter had turned out to have the

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

greater predictive power. But since its superiority had not been conclusively demonstrated I decided to keep them both in the 112-case analysis. I did, however, omit the variable, percentage of married women (with children under 18) working, since it had proven so weak a predictor in the 63-case study. Thus table 6 shows correlation coefficients involving four independent variables, not five as in table 2.

TABLE 6

INTERCORRELATION OF VARIABLES IN SECOND REPLICATION, FOR 112 SMSAs (1970)

	Crime Index	Heterogeneity	Two-Way Migration	In-Migration
Heterogeneity	—.35	...	...	...
Two-way migration	—.09	—.01	...	...
In-migration	—.20	—.06	.91	...
Dwelling value spread	—.30	.19	.11	.29

It is evident from comparison with table 2 that the substitution of the crime index for the integration index has paid off in larger coefficients. The relations are still weak, however, compared with table 1 (1940). The new coefficients are: for heterogeneity, —.35 instead of —.59; for two-way migration, only —.09 instead of —.49; for in-migration, —.20 as compared with —.43 for rate of growth; and for dwelling value spread, —.30 as compared with —.65 for rental spread. The coefficients of multiple correlation with the crime index shown in table 7 have a similar status. They

TABLE 7

MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS OF VARIOUS SETS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH CRIME INDEX FOR 112 SMSAs (1970)

Independent Variables	*R*
Heterogeneity and two-way migration	—.36
Heterogeneity, two-way migration, and dwelling value spread	—.43
Heterogeneity and in-migration	—.41
Heterogeneity, in-migration, and dwelling value spread	—.45

are considerably higher than their counterparts with the integration index as the dependent variable in the 63-case analysis (table 5), but are still much lower than the corresponding 1940 coefficients (table 1).

It is clear from the zero-order correlations and the multiple correlations that the two-way migration measure again proved of less predictive value than in-migration alone. It seems that the in-migration measure (solid census data for what happened over a five-year period) had greater pre-

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

dictive validity than the measure of population turnover. The latter was theoretically superior but operationally less sound because it assumed that a five-year rate of in-migration could be doubled to produce a valid 10-year rate. It should be noted that heterogeneity and each of the mobility measures are substantially independent.

The best predictor of moral integration as operationalized by the crime index has proved to be a combination of heterogeneity, in-migration, and dwelling value spread. The coefficient of multiple correlation between these three and the dependent variable is —.45. The corresponding coefficient in the 63-case study using the same dependent variable (table 5) was —.38. Thus the increase in number of cases from 63 to 112 has given greater predictive power. The result is still markedly inferior to that for 1940, however, where heterogeneity, mobility, and rental spread produced a multiple correlation coefficient of —.80. Whereas 64% of the variance in moral integration in 1940 could be accounted for by three independent variables, only 20% of the 1970 variance can be accounted for by a slightly different triad.

A Modified Replication including the Population Factor

I had become impressed, as I worked with the 1970 data, with the strong possibility that the population size of a city above 100,000, not a significant variable in 1940, had become one by 1970. I have therefore added it to the three independent variables that proved their significance in table 6.

Table 8 shows the results of the new analysis. It is immediately apparent that population size has become influential indeed. It is more highly correlated with crime than any of the other independent variables; moreover, with population size added the multiple correlation with the crime index rises (an R of —.58 compared with —.45 in table 7). Thus instead of having explained only 20% of the variance in moral integration (represented by the crime index) we have now explained 34%. This is progress, but we are still far short of the 62% obtained in the 1940 study.

TABLE 8

INTERCORRELATIONS OF HETEROGENEITY, IN-MIGRATION, DWELLING VALUE SPREAD, POPULATION SIZE, AND CRIME INDEX FOR 112 SMSAs (1970)

	Crime Index	Heterogeneity	In-Migration	Dwelling Value Spread
Heterogeneity	—.35	...	...	...
In-migration	—.20	—.06	...	...
Dwelling value spread	—.30	.19	.29	...
Population size	—.42	.18	—.14	.32

NOTE.—$R = -.58$.

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

It is clear that the population factor is contributing something over and above the influences of ethnic group maladjustments, strains from mobility, and class disparities. That something is probably composed of several specific negative influences. As an SMSA grows, the following developments seem likely: bureaucracies of all kinds increase in size and complexity, thereby adding to alienation and apathy; effects of bureaucratization aside, life becomes more impersonal and unrewarding; internalization of norms grows less thorough as the interests of family members become more distant in space and more divergent in character; and both informal and formal social controls become less equal to the task of maintaining public order.

CHANGES IN AMERICAN CITIES

In addition to the new significance of population size, are there other reasons why the 1970 replication is so disappointing? In an excellent discussion of recent changes in American cities, Roland L. Warren (1972) provides several clues.

Some of the changes emphasized by Warren that may be affecting cities differentially should have been caught by the independent variables used here. Thus the impact of changing ethnic composition should be measured by the heterogeneity index; that of massive internal migration by the indexes of mobility; that of changing socialization of youth in part at least by the percentage of married women working; that of changing class satisfactions by the dwelling value spread.

Did other pertinent changes over the three decades from 1940 to 1970 escape my analysis? One that Warren treats is a gradual loss of local autonomy produced by the subordination of local business and governmental organizations to decisions reached at regional and national levels. This trend was not brought out by my analysis, but it fits smoothly with it. The moral integration of a metropolitan community today is less the product of local conditions than it was 30 years ago. Crime is probably a good indicator of moral integration, but the amount of crime in an urban area is increasingly a result of influences difficult to measure there. The growth of state and federal programs of assistance, for instance, makes the metropolitan community a less closed system. It may be rejoined that such assistance tends to be uniform across all metropolitan areas and is therefore not a variable that can account for community differences. But state programs, at least, differ widely, and even federal programs may be administered more effectively in some states than in others. These influences, though not difficult to identify, would present many obstacles to measurement.

Again, consider the fact that 19 of the SMSAs containing one or more

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

cities of 100,000 are along the eastern seaboard between Boston and Washington. In this almost continuous strip of metropolitan life each SMSA may well be receiving influences from neighboring SMSAs that affect its moral integration. "Independence" may have become a fiction. But we are largely ignorant of what these influences are, let alone of how to measure them.

Another change that almost certainly accounts for loss of predictive power is greater homogeneity in moral integration among SMSAs in 1970 than among cities in 1940. This is evidenced by the ratios of highest scores to lowest scores on the crime index in the two studies. In 1940 the highest score was approximately 12 times the lowest, whereas in 1970 it was six times. The more condensed distribution of the dependent variable in 1970 lessens the leverage of independent variables and tends to reduce correlations. Some of this greater homogeneity may result from the increased dominance of national and regional institutions over local ones, but probably more of it results from internal migration. The latter will be discussed when we compare over time the ranks in moral integration of cities included in both the 1940 and 1970 studies.

With growth in size and in responsibility to agencies outside the metropolitan area, relations among local organizations, according to Warren, have become more formal. There is not so much personal acquaintance among decision makers as earlier, and problems are handled with less mutual understanding. No doubt population size itself would measure much of the variation in this characteristic, but there may well be other factors that play a part, such as the degree of spatial concentration or diffusion of the population.

The changes so far mentioned have brought serious housekeeping problems for local governments. The metropolis has spread outward, bringing formerly separate towns and villages as well as new suburbs into close contact with the central city, usually without a merger of governments. The difficulties of carrying out necessary joint services across jurisdictional lines have been great. Moreover, as wealthier citizens have moved to residential suburbs, the financing of the government of the central city has become extremely difficult in the absence of state permission to tax commuters. A very different kind of problem is the pollution of local air and water arising from intensive industrialization. It produces headaches for those charged with enforcement of antipollution laws and health risks for the citizenry. Finally, the fading away of mass transit has delivered the center of the city to frustrating traffic jams and acres of ugly parking lots. Governments are now faced with reinstating the transit facilities that the public abandoned or building new ones. The seriousness of each of these problems varies from city to city, and their impact may have differential significance for moral integration.

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The desertion of the central city by those who can afford to live in suburbs has weakened the identification with the central city of many well-educated potential metropolitan leaders. True, they may be exercising leadership in the suburbs, but leadership there may not constitute the most advantageous use of their talents for the metropolitan area as a whole. Some SMSAs probably suffer much more than others from this loss of identification, which thus affects their moral integration differentially.

When we consider the turmoil (impaired moral integration) of large American cities since the early sixties, it is very difficult to disentangle indicators of integration from predictors thereof. Everywhere there is circular causation. Drug abuse produces crime, and criminals find a lucrative new role as "pushers." Idealistic youth, campaigning for civil rights and resorting to violence when balked, stimulate a backlash which splits the community in ways damaging to consensus on policies relating to youth in the future. Cities differ in the degree of such turmoil (which may or may not be indexed by crime rates), but we do not know whether the independent variables already discussed would predict these differences. If they do not, we have only the vaguest ideas on how to fashion new predictors that would be effective.

Finally, there is the shift from the city to the SMSA as the focus of collective life. As stated earlier, I do not regard this as a matter of research design, since it is a fact of life. (A shift to the less extensive "urbanized area" of the census could not be substituted because the appropriate crime rates were not available.) The central city was already doubtful as a functionally independent unit in 1940. It is clearly obsolete now. The boundary of the central city means very little in terms of patterns of economic life. The change in social accounting from city to SMSA, though it marshals data on many subjects more appropriately, may well have impaired the study of moral integration. What is suitable as a focus for human ecology is not necessarily suitable for normative relations. It is arguable that the SMSA is not as real a sociopsychological community as the city was in 1940 and that one should not expect it to respond as predictably to influences toward or away from moral integration. Cities and suburbs have often been at odds over matters of taxation—a city income tax levied on commuters, for instance—and lately there have been severe conflicts over cross-district busing to achieve racial integration in schools. Moreover, SMSAs may be less standard entities than cities because an entire county has to be either included or excluded, so that there is a considerable range among the proportions of rural population in SMSAs. Given the differing interests of urban and rural residents in such matters as the allocation of highway funds and the support prices for agricultural products, the SMSAs with higher proportions of rural population should

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

find it more difficult to achieve a level of moral integration comparable with that achieved by SMSAs with lower proportions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIOLOGY OF THE CHANGES SINCE 1940

Thus we see that many changes since 1940 suggest the need for new independent variables if we are to get as good leverage on moral integration as was obtained for 1940. This need clearly shows the difference between sociology and the physical sciences. In the latter, good predictive variables, once achieved, continue to be powerful in analysis and need only marginal supplementation. But the physical world is not a learning system. Human society is, and as a consequence the sociologist is faced with the necessity of reshaping his tools of analysis as the structure of the world he studies changes.

It is now apparent that the first of the two questions for which answers were sought in this study—whether social change has rendered the theoretical conclusions of the previous study invalid—can be given only an equivocal answer. The predictive power of the independent variables found effective for 1940 has drastically lessened. On the other hand, the addition of only one independent variable, one that was expected to have predictive power for 1940 but did not, has brought the crucial multivariate prediction of moral integration back to a respectable level. The results are still, however, markedly inferior to those achieved 30 years ago. This situation points to the urgent need of finding a new positive indicator of moral integration to replace welfare effort as measured by support for a United Fund, an indicator that could be combined with the inverted crime index to form a new moral integration index. It is not likely that this would yield the high multiple correlation of —.80 obtained for 1940, but it should improve the multiple correlation of —.58 obtained in the 112-case analysis when population size was added.

I was struck forcibly, in reading Warren's *The Community in America* and scanning his footnotes, by the paucity of sociological writing since World War II on the integration of large social aggregates. There is a rich literature on cohesion in small groups: there are excellent demographic studies of relations and processes in cities and SMSAs, fascinating case studies of small communities that include comment on social integration, and the well-known studies of community power structure. But a quick canvass of the principal sociological journals turned up very little that bears directly on the systematic study of macrosocial solidarity.

There is more in the political science literature, over and above the intense interest in community power structure and decision making. Karl W. Deutsch has pioneered studies of integration at the national level

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

(Deutsch 1953; Deutsch et al. 1957), as has Philip E. Jacob at the community level (Jacob and Toscano 1964). A later study treats political integration in general from the standpoint of a system's capacity to withstand the disruptive impact of social change (Ake 1967).

In sociology there was a flurry of interest during the early fifties, possibly stimulated by the study here replicated. But as research on community power structure came to the fore, research on integration died away. Nine relevant items, however, are still worth review by those contemplating studies in this field. Interesting background data are to be found in a paper on community typology (Jonassen 1959) and in one on the effects of functional specialization of cities (Reiss 1957). Contributions to the methodology of community research are made in four papers (Fessler 1952; Reiss 1954; Baur 1954; and Clark 1968). The Community Chest campaign as an index of integration is the subject of one broad empirical study (Anderson 1954), and how the success of a Community Chest can be evaluated by social science is treated at length in a monographic study (Seeley et al. 1957). A well-known book gives a broad interpretation of trends bearing on integration (Stein 1960).

CONSISTENCY IN MORAL INTEGRATION OVER TIME OF PARTICULAR CITIES

Now for the second question with which we started: Have the metropolitan communities common to both studies maintained similar relative positions on a scale of moral integration? Despite the tremendous increase in crime in 30 years, do the communities tend to fall in the same rank order? Table 9 shows the standardized crime scores for 1940 and 1970 of 40 of the 43 metropolitan communities studied in 1940. The other three did not have satisfactory crime data in 1970. Bridgeport and Worcester were two of the SMSAs whose boundaries were changed too late for the 1970 *Uniform Crime Reports,* and Reading had been absorbed in the SMSA titled "Allentown-Bethlehem-Reading."

The coefficient of rank-order correlation between the 1940 series and the 1970 series is .41. This indicates only a moderate degree of persistence of the moral integration pattern over time. Inspection of table 9 shows, however, that only 11 of the 40 have shifted their positions by 1 SD or more. When one reflects on all the influences that have impinged differentially on these communities over 30 years, this stability of relative position is impressive. It indicates that moral integration has some cultural roots. Since table 9 presents standard scores, it says nothing about amounts of crime in 1940 and 1970. We already know that crime rose rapidly in most large cities.

What is more interesting than the community-by-community comparison is the comparison by region, shown in table 10. These figures reveal

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

TABLE 9

STANDARDIZED CRIME INDEX FOR 40 METROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES (1940 AND 1970)

Community	1940	1970	Change
Milwaukee	1.77	1.83	+0.06
Buffalo	1.63	0.90	−0.73
Rochester	1.51	1.29	−0.22
Syracuse	1.46	1.29	−0.17
Wichita	1.11	0.15	−0.96
San Diego	1.08	0.89	−0.19
Erie	0.97	0.85	−0.12
Denver	0.92	−0.91	−1.83
Des Moines	0.85	1.05	+0.20
Grand Rapids	0.85	0.96	+0.11
Peoria	0.82	0.54	−0.28
Baltimore	0.78	−1.55	−2.33
Dayton	0.59	−0.16	−0.75
Tacoma	0.57	0.49	−0.08
South Bend	0.42	0.37	−0.05
Trenton	0.40	−0.86	−1.26
Detroit	0.35	−2.87	−3.22
Cleveland	0.33	0.26	−0.07
Akron	0.26	0.83	+0.57
Flint	0.19	0.22	+0.03
Toledo	0.14	0.50	+0.36
Fort Worth	−0.12	−0.02	+0.10
Oklahoma City	−0.26	0.63	+0.89
Spokane	−0.28	0.87	+1.15
Dallas	−0.35	−0.69	−0.34
Houston	−0.35	−1.06	−0.71
Seattle	−0.47	−0.89	−0.42
Nashville	−0.63	−0.22	+0.41
Birmingham	−0.70	0.86	+1.56
Indianapolis	−0.80	−0.05	+0.75
Richmond	−0.82	−0.89	−0.07
Chattanooga	−0.87	−0.26	+0.61
Portland, Ore.	−0.99	−0.63	+0.36
Columbus, Ohio	−1.10	0.03	+1.13
Jacksonville	−1.10	−2.08	−0.98
Miami	−1.20	−1.88	−0.68
Louisville	−1.60	0.12	+1.72
Memphis	−1.67	0.14	+1.81
Tulsa	−1.69	0.47	+2.16
Atlanta	−1.98	−0.53	+1.45

NOTE.—The scores in each distribution have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.00.

how strong the tendency is toward a leveling of moral integration among American cities. The northern cities still show the highest scores, but they no longer have the great superiority they had in 1940. The western cities have also declined relatively, but more moderately. It is the southern cities that show the most dramatic change, and that a relative improvement.

These trends undoubtedly reflect in part the great migration northward of poor southerners in the last 30 years, a majority of them black, and the rising educational level in the South. The contrast between the fortunes of Baltimore and Detroit on the one hand and Atlanta, Birmingham, Louis-

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

TABLE 10

MEAN STANDARDIZED CRIME INDEX FOR 40 METROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES BY REGIONS (1940 AND 1970)

Region	1940	1970	Change
20 northern communities*	.627	.279	—.348
14 southern communities†	—.953	—.386	.566
6 western communities‡	.138	—.030	—.168

* Akron; Baltimore; Buffalo; Cleveland; Columbus, Ohio; Dayton; Des Moines; Detroit; Erie; Flint; Grand Rapids; Indianapolis; Milwaukee; Peoria; Rochester; South Bend; Syracuse; Toledo; Trenton; and Wichita.
† Atlanta, Birmingham, Chattanooga, Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, Jacksonville, Louisville, Memphis, Miami, Nashville, Oklahoma City, Richmond, and Tulsa.
‡ Denver, Portland, San Diego, Seattle, Spokane, and Tacoma.

ville, Memphis, and Tulsa on the other is instructive. Denver, classified as a western city, has fared badly also. Since World War II it has had to cope with a rapid inflow of new population, including many poor Chicanos. Noteworthy exceptions to the trend of southern relative improvement are the two Florida cities of Jacksonville and Miami. Both were very low in moral integration in 1940, and they have sunk even lower today.

This evidence supports the belief that industrialization and resulting internal migrations are producing similar problems in most large American urban communities and are thereby rendering them more and more alike.

CONCLUSION

From my attempted replication of a 30-year-old study I would draw four general conclusions: the moral integration of large American urban communities as measured by the indicators used in these two studies was seriously impaired during the period from 1940 to 1970; these communities are becoming more alike in moral integration; city population size above 100,000 has become a significant independent variable though it was not in 1940; the difficulties of studying moral integration in such communities have increased.

REFERENCES

Ake, Claude. 1967. *The Theory of Political Integration.* New York: Dorsey.
Anderson, C. Arnold. 1954. "Community Chest Campaign as an Index of Community Integration." *Social Forces* 33 (October): 76–81.
Angell, Robert Cooley. 1936. *The Family Encounters the Depression.* New York: Scribner's.
———. 1942. "The Social Integration of Selected American Cities." *American Journal of Sociology* 47 (January): 575–92.
———. 1947. "The Social Integration of Cities of More than 100,000 Population." *American Sociological Review* 12 (June): 335–42.
———. 1949. "Moral Integration and Interpersonal Integration in American Cities." *American Sociological Review* 14 (April): 245–51.

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

———. 1951. "The Moral Integration of American Cities." *American Journal of Sociology* 57, no. 1, pt. 2 (July).

Baur, Edward Jackson. 1954. "Statistical Indexes of the Social Aspects of Communities." *Social Forces* 33 (October): 64–75.

Clark, Terry N. 1968. "Social Stratification, Differentiation and Integration." In *Community Structure and Decision Making,* edited by Terry N. Clark. Scranton, Pa.: Chandler.

Deutsch, Karl W. 1953. *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality.* New York: Wiley.

Deutsch, Karl W., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Karin, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen. 1957. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Fessler, Donald R. 1952. "The Development of a Scale for Measuring Community Solidarity." *Rural Sociology* 17 (June): 144–52.

Jacob, Philip E., and James V. Toscano. 1964. *The Integration of Political Communities.* Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Jonassen, Christen T. 1959. "Community Typology." In *Community Structure and Analysis,* edited by Marvin Sussman. New York: Crowell.

Reiss, Albert J., Jr. 1954. "Some Logical and Methodological Problems in Community Research." *Social Forces* 33 (October): 51–57.

———. 1957. "Functional Specialization of Cities." In *Cities and Society: The Revised Reader in Urban Sociology,* edited by Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Seeley, John R., Bufford H. Junker, R. Wallace Jones, Jr., N. C. Jenkins, M. T. Haugh, and I. Miller. 1957. *Community Chest: A Case Study in Philanthropy.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Stein, Maurice R. 1960. *The Eclipse of Community: An Interpretation of American Studies.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Thorndike, Edward Lee. 1940. *Your City.* New York: Harcourt, Brace.

U.S., Bureau of the Census. *Census of Housing: 1970. Housing Characteristics for States, Cities and Counties.* Table 11 (for data on dwelling value spread). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

———. *Census of Population: 1970. Characteristics of the Population.* PC(1)A, table 40 (for population of SMSAs); *General Population Characteristics.* PC(1)B, table 22 (for married women working), table 23 (for Negro and other races), and table 25 (for household population and mean size of household); *General Social and Economic Characteristics.* PC(1)C, table 82 (for in-migration); *Detailed Characteristics.* PC(1)D, table 138 (for foreign-born whites). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

———. *Census of Population and Housing: 1970. General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan Areas: 1960 to 1970.* PHC(2)-1, table 11 (for two-way migration calculation). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S., Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1971. *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States: 1970.* Table 5 (for crime rates). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Warren, Roland L. 1972. *The Community in America.* 2d ed. Chicago: Rand McNally.

This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 17:02:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions